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THE HISTORY BEHIND ATHLETE AGENT REGULATION AND
THE "SLAM DUNKING OF STATUTORY HURDLES"
DIANE SUDIA* & ROB REMIS**
I. INTRODUCTION
The gentle, warm-hearted, loving athlete agent sees the
stranded linebacker furiously trying to check the air pres-
sure on the "Wilderness Exploder" tires mounted like a
deadly time bomb underneath the linebacker's SUV. The
fury emerges from the fact that the university passed the
linebacker through his math classes without him ever tak-
ing a math test during the entire six years he attended the
university. The linebacker simply could not subtract the
number displaying on the modern, digital tire gauge from
the number posted on the inside of the vehicle door to see
how much air each of the "Wilderness Exploders" would
need. To make matters worse, the linebacker kept losing
track of which tires had which amount of air pressure. His
lack of memory forced him to recount the tires' pressure
more times than a Palm Beach County, Florida voter
punches a tally card while voting in a Presidential election.
The athlete agent took the time to show the linebacker an
easy way to figure out the tire pressure needed without
having to multiply, divide, subtract, add or raise a number
to the infinity power - a feat none of his professors ever
took the time to do. Instead, the professors just kept ask-
ing him if he was prepared for the big game next week-
end. The linebacker shows his gratitude with a big "thank
you" and a greasy handshake. The linebacker then starts
his SUV and takes off. Despite the correct air pressure in
each tire, each tire explodes one by one and the truck im-
mediately rolls over. The athlete agent turns his head,
gasps in amazement, shouts for help, jumps onto the
burning truck and opens the door. The linebacker sits un-
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conscious, so the athlete agent unbuckles the seatbelt and
lifts the 220-pound linebacker over his shoulder. The ath-
lete agent jumps off the truck and runs, still carrying the
linebacker over his shoulder. After reaching a distance of
twenty yards, the truck explodes, closely mirroring a scene
from Mission Impossible. The athlete agent then gives the
linebacker CPR and saves his life. The agent gives the
linebacker a medal of St. Joseph that the athlete agent al-
ways wears around his neck and says, "I think you need
this more than I do. Wear it proudly. It will bring comfort
and peace to your life as it has mine."
Oh, oh! The athlete agent just gave the linebacker a gift.
Witnessing this, Sheriff Thoggs immediately arrests the
agent and escorts him to jail. The judge, a big fan of the
linebacker's team, finds herself unhappy over the fact that
the NCAA declares the linebacker ineligible to play and
that the team thereby loses the SEC Title game due to a
poorly executed defense without the star linebacker. In
response, the judge sentences the agent to five years in the
state penitentiary without eligibility for parole. The appel-
late court affirms the trial court's decision - per curiam.
The man next to the agent, who is in for armed robbery
and seventeen counts of murder, smiles insanely and asks,
"Man, what are you in for? Can I have that suit?" The
agent ponders whether to respond with "I saved a college
kid and gave him a token gift, and yes the suit should fit
you nicely," or "I blew up a guy's car with explosives and
watched it burn to the ground with the driver in it, man.
And no, the suit's mine."
With the energy and intensity of a full court press, several state
legislatures decided to regulate athlete agents. At current count,
twenty-eight athlete agent statutes exist in the United States.' A
1. The twenty-eight legislatures enacted the following athlete agent statutes.
See ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-1 to -41 (1999); Amiz. REV. STAT. §§ 15-1761 to -1765 (1999);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 17-16-101 to -203 (Michie 1999); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 6106.7, 18895 to 18897.93 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 23-16-101 to -108
(1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-553 to -569 (1999); FLA. STAT. ch. §§ 468.451 to
.4571 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-4A-1 to -19 (2000); IND. CODE §§ 35-464-1 to -4(1998); IOWA CODE §§ 9A.1 to .12 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1501 to -1515
(1998); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 164.680-.689 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 4:420-433 (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN. Bus. REG. §§ 4-401 to -426 (1999); MicH.
COMp. LAws § 750.411e (1991); MiNN. STAT. § 325E.33 (1995); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 73-41-1 to -23 (1999); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 317.018, 436.200 to .212 (1999); NEV.
REv. STAT. 398.015 to .255, 597.920 (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78C-71 to -81
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twenty-ninth state enacted, but then subsequently repealed, athlete
agent legislation. 2 As will be demonstrated in this Article, athlete
agent statutes invariably possess numerous defects that might pre-
clude enforcement. Thus, only time will tell if such legislative activ-
ity serves any valuable purpose.
Part II of this Article will set forth the historical background
underlying athlete agent legislation across the country. It will also
discuss the regulatory scheme of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCAA") and the reasons why twenty-eight states cur-
rently regulate athlete agents. 3 Additionally, Part II questions the
need for, and even desirability of, athlete agent legislation.
Part III of this Article will analyze the primary areas of athlete
agent activity that states regulate. It will also analyze some constitu-
tional defects and loopholes contained within the athlete agent stat-
utes and provide athlete agents with a way to "slam dunk the
statutory hurdles" through use of various escape routes gratuitously
paved by the legislatures themselves via inartfully drafted legisla-
tion. Part III will also set forth some examples of the ludicrous re-
sults achieved by the states through such improvidently worded
statutes. Additionally, Part III analyzes the Uniform Athlete Agents
Act ("UAA"), recently approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") at its 2000 an-
nual conference. 4 The NCCUSL spent many hours and thought-
fully drafted the UAA. To date, the UAA is one of the best athlete
agent statutes in existence. As analyzed in Part III, however, the
UAA does not attain perfection. Although some provisions could
have been worded differently to achieve better results, the end re-
sult of the NCCUSL's efforts proves workable and far better than
most state athlete agent statutes. Again, only time will tell if any
(1998); N.D. CFNT. CODE §§ 9-15-01 to -05 (1999); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 4771.01 to .99 (Anderson 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, §§ 821.61 to .71 (1997);
H.B. 3628, §§ 1-12, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999); 5 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3101 to
3312 (1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7107 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-90, 16-1-
100, 59-102-10 to -50 (Law. Co-op. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-7-2111 to -2121
(1999); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 2051.001 to .553 (Vernon 1999).
2. See H.B. 1251, 56th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999) (repealing Washing-
ton's athlete agent statute).
3. Some states also regulate athletes (as opposed to athlete agents only).
4. Readers can acquire a copy of the UAA through the NCCUSL's official
Web site: http://www.nccusl.org. The annual conference occurred in St. Augus-
tine, Florida during the week of July 28 - August 4, 2000. See id.
2001]
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states will adopt the UAA - including those with and those without
athlete agent legislation currently on their books.5
II. HiSTORicAL BACKGROUND: SHOULD STATES EVEN
REGULATE ATHLETE AGENTS?
A. The Infamous Unscrupulous Athlete
Agent/Law of Economics
Many state legislatures hold a belief that agents exist on Earth
as evil creatures or, at least, to cause evil consequences. The com-
monly held legislative belief that athlete agent activity constitutes
"unscrupulous" behavior surfaces in some statutory declarations. 6
Although this belief may possess some merit in limited circum-
stances, it surely fails as a broad principle. 7 As will be demonstrated
in the following discussion, one could go so far as to say that the
NCAA deserves the "real culprit" title, not athlete agents.
The real reason legislatures enact athlete agent statutes directly
transcends from the NCAA rules and regulations. Were it not for
the NCAA, state legislatures likely would not find a need to regulate
athlete agents. 8 This statement is true even though some state stat-
utes directly or indirectly include organizations other than the
NCAA under their auspices.9 The underlying basis for this assump-
tion (i.e., that states would not bother regulating agents "but for"
the NCAA) finds its roots in the law of economics. Specifically,
5. Twenty-eight states currently possess athlete agent legislation. For a list of
these statutes, see supra note 1. Thus, twenty-three legislatures (twenty-two states
and Washington, D.C.) currently maintain no such legislation.
6. See FLA. STAT. ch. § 468.451 (2000). Florida's athlete agent statute, for ex-
ample, provides: "The Legislature finds that dishonest or unscrupulous practices
by agents who solicit representation of student-athletes can cause significant harm
to student-athletes and the academic institutions for which they play. It is the in-
tent of the Legislature to protect the interests of student-athletes and academic
institutions by regulating the activities of athlete agents." Id.; see also COLO. REv.
STAT. § 23-16-101 (1998).
7. See Rob Remis, Analysis of Civil and Criminal Penalties in Athlete Agent Statutes
and Support for the Imposition of Civil and Criminal Liability Upon Athletes, 8 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 1, 33 n.127 (1998) (citing scandals involving athlete agents that
appeared in print and courts over years such as FSU Footlocker Scandal).
8. See supra notes 1, 5 and accompanying text. Some states still might find the
need to require athlete agents to hold occupational licenses. However, this consti-
tutes speculation, and the fact remains that twenty-three jurisdictions still do not
regulate agents at all - even with the NCAA regulations in place. See id.
9. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:422.1, 4:424 (West 1999). For instance, Louisi-
ana provides that athlete agents may not violate the rules promulgated by any "fed-
eration or association," not just the NCAA. Id.; see also Diane Sudia & Rob Remis,
Athlete Agent Solicitation of Athlete Clients: Statutory Authorization and Prohibition, 10
SETON -LiJ. SPORT L. 205, app. at 234-64 (2000) (citing additional states that do
not limit their statutory scope to NCAA).
[Vol. 8: p. 67
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some NCAA sports such as men's football and basketball equate to
"big money" for state schools and athletic programs.10 No other
collegiate sports organization generates as much massive revenue as
the NCAA. The financial stake for men's NCAA football alone
quickly reaches the multi-million dollar threshold for Division I
bowl game payouts.' This number does not even include multi-
million dollar television contract proceeds or other items of sports
revenue. 12 Since a state university potentially could lose this multi-
million dollar revenue tree pursuant to the NCAA rules discussed
below, the state interest in regulating athlete agent activity suddenly
shines brightly. Hence, twenty-eight states currently regulate ath-
lete agent activity.1 3 Even a cursory review of the twenty-eight stat-
utes (especially those containing multiple references to the NCAA)
clearly demonstrates that violation of NCAA rules remains the im-
petus for enactment and continual amendment of state athlete
agent statutes. 14 The following review of the NCAA regulations also
demonstrates in greater detail exactly why states experience a need
to protect themselves through enactment of athlete agent statutes.
B. NCAA: Historical Principle of Amateurism/
Limited Jurisdiction
The NCAA historically has prided itself on its principle of ama-
teurism. Specifically, the NCAA expressed its "Principle of Ama-
teurism" as follows: "Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated
primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social bene-
fits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics
is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from ex-
ploitation by professional and commercial enterprises."1 5 The
NCAA's Constitution further provides: "A basic purpose of this As-
sociation is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part
of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of
the student body and, by doing so, retain a clear line of demarca-
10. See Remis, supra note 7, at 54-59 nn.212-41 and accompanying text.
11. See id. (listing bowl pay-outs to conferences on behalf of each team for
1997-1998 football season).
12. See id. Many other sources of revenue exist such as shoe and apparel con-
tracts and coaches' weekly television shows. See id.
13. See generally supra note 1 (referencing athlete agent statutes).
14. See id.
15. NCAA, 1999-2000 NCAA MANUAL § 2.9 (2000) [hereinafter NCAA MAN-
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tion between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports." 16
One reason twenty-eight states maintain athlete agent legislation is
to protect the athlete's amateur status and the university upon vio-
lation of the NCAA's principle of amateurism. 17
The NCAA's limited or non-existent jurisdictional power is a
second reason that states enact athlete agent legislation. Stated
bluntly, only the federal government and the individual states pos-
sess the power to regulate agents; the NCAA simply lacks jurisdic-
tion to regulate athlete agents.18 The NCAA is merely a voluntary
organization with jurisdiction only over its member constituents
(i.e., the colleges and universities that elect to join the NCAA). It
does not even have jurisdiction over its athletes, and it must instead
enforce its rules against its member institutions. 19 In other words,
if an athlete violates an NCAA rule or regulation, the NCAA will
mandate that the member university not allow the athlete to partici-
pate further in intercollegiate sports. 20 If the member institution
refuses to comply with or otherwise violates NCAA rules, the NCAA
sanctions the institution. 21 Importantly, the NCAA can issue ex-
tremely harsh (even devastating) sanctions against colleges and uni-
versities for violation of NCAA rules, including, most severely, loss
or forfeiture of multi-million dollar bowl payouts and television ap-
pearances (and associated television revenues).22
C. Whom States Should Protect
States possess a strong interest in protecting several kinds of
persons or entities. First, and of foremost concern, a state might
feel an overwhelming need to protect its state-supported colleges
16. Id. § 1.3.1 (explaining basic purpose of competitive athletic programs).
17. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (regarding method by which
NCAA sanctions universities).
18. See Rob Remis, The Art of Being a Sports Agent in More Than One State: Analy-
sis of Registration and Reporting Requirements and Development of a Model Strategy, 8
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 419, 448 n.128 (1998) (noting that no federal athlete
agent statute exists, just twenty-eight state statutes and UAA).
19. See id. (noting that NCAA has only indirect jurisdiction over student-
athletes).
20. NCAA MANu u, supra note 15, § 14.11.1. Specifically, the NCAA provides:
"If a student-athlete is ineligible under the provisions of the constitution, bylaws or
other regulations of the Association, the institution shall be obligated to apply im-
mediately the applicable rule and to withhold the student-athlete from all intercol-
legiate competition." Id. The institution may appeal to the Academics/Eligibility/
Compliance Cabinet for restoration of the student-athlete's eligibility as provided
in § 14.12 if it concludes that "the circumstances warrant restoration." Id.
21. See Remis, supra note 7, at 54-59 nn.212-41 and accompanying text.
22. See id. (citing large pay-outs and television rights as essential for each
team).
[Vol. 8: p. 67
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and universities. The reason is self-evident: if a state-supported uni-
versity loses or forfeits a multi-million dollar payout, that state-sup-
ported school will look to that state's taxpayers for those same
resources.
Second, states would also likely feel the need to protect the
private universities located within the state's physical borders. Pri-
vate universities obviously offer many advantages to a state and loss
of a multi-million dollar payout to an in-state private university eas-
ily seems to warrant state protection as well.23
Third, a state has an interest in protecting its own citizens (i.e.,
the athletes, coaches, other students and employees who would suf-
fer at the loss of a multi-million dollar payout to the university). If a
state loses a multi-million dollar NCAA payout, even non-athletic
programs will suffer, because the university would need to find
money from some other source in order to support athletics (i.e.,
athletics might take away funds from a Biology department to offer
scholarships or professorial contracts to potential future Nobel
prize winners).
Fourth, out-of-state residents who attend the university would
also suffer from the university's loss of millions of dollars through
items such as lost scholarship opportunities. Finally, athletes de-
clared ineligible by the NCAA from further intercollegiate athletics
participation for violating the amateurism principle likely would
suffer lost employment opportunities with professional sports orga-
nizations such as the National Football League. To an athlete,
these lost employment opportunities could mean the loss of multi-
million dollar contracts (or at least the signing of less valuable
contracts).
In sum, when one examines the devastating consequences to a
state and its individual and institutional residents and citizens,
blaming a state or the NCCUSL for enacting an athlete agent stat-
ute (or amending one already enacted) becomes increasingly diffi-
cult. If neither the NCAA nor the educational institution can
regulate athlete agents due to lack of jurisdictional power, the state
faces losing millions of dollars due to athlete agent actions that
cause student-athletes and/or institutional personnel to violate
NCAA rules.
23. The benefits of having a private university within a state is well beyond the
scope of this Article. One would be hard-pressed to argue that Massachusetts
would not care about losing Harvard or Connecticut would not care about losing
Yale. The prestige, national research dollars and bright students brought into the
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D. Potential Dangers Athlete Agents Pose to States
1. Executing Contracts
Despite the devastating financial wrath that can be wrought
upon states through NCAA sanctions, it remains relatively easy (the-
oretically at least) to decipher what NCAA rules apply to athlete
agents. Because the NCAA does not regulate athlete agents due to
lack of jurisdiction, one must analyze those NCAA regulations gov-
erning athletes and their relationship to other individuals. 24 Upon
examination of the great amount of regulations contained within
the NCAA Division I Manual, one notes that very few provisions ac-
tually relate to athletes' relationships with athlete agents. 25 In fact,
there are basically only two areas of concern to the NCAA regarding
athlete agents. First, the NCAA prohibits student-athletes from exe-
cuting contracts with athlete agents, thereby prohibiting athlete
agents from representing student-athletes in negotiations with pro-
fessional sports teams.26 A more detailed analysis of the NCAA
rules regulating contract execution lies beyond the scope of this
Article but is addressed in another Article. 27 It is important, how-
ever, to note that the NCAA prohibits not only written contracts but
verbal agreements as well. 28 This NCAA prohibition against agent
contracts obviously relates back to the NCAA's stated goals of pre-
serving amateurism and retaining the clear line of demarcation be-
tween intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.29 If an
athlete agent represents the student-athlete in negotiations with
professional teams while the student-athlete still competes in inter-
collegiate athletics, the NCAA's "clear line" of demarcation be-
tween intercollegiate athletics and professional sports loses focus
and blurs profusely.
2. Bestowing Gifts
The second area of concern to the NCAA regarding athlete
agents relates to gifts. Without exception, the NCAA prohibits stu-
dent-athletes from accepting gifts from athlete agents.30 Again, this
24. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (regarding NCAA's lack ofjuris-
diction over athlete agents).
25. See generally NCAA MANuAL, supra note 15.
26. See id. §§ 12.3.1-12.3.2.1.
27. For a more detailed analysis of the NCAA's contractual prohibitions and
requirements, see Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, Athlete Agent Contracts: Legislative Regu-
lation, 10 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 317 (2000).
28. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 12.3.1.
29. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
30. See NCAA MANuAL, supra note 15, §§ 12.3.1.2, 12.1.1.
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NCAA prohibition relates back to its goal of preserving amateurism
and retaining a clear line between intercollegiate athletics and pro-
fessional sports.31 Accordingly, allowing one student-athlete to
drive to school in a limousine and live in a $2,000,000 mansion
(transportation and living expenses provided, of course, by an "un-
scrupulous" athlete agent), while other student-athletes live in pov-
erty and barely have enough groceries to survive, convincingly
bestows an unfair benefit upon one student-athlete over others. In
turn, that student-athlete might be more rested, fed, energized,
physically fit, happy, and emotionally stable than other athletes on
game day. This surely would compromise the integrity of intercol-
legiate sports, especially considering that the NCAA historically and
valiantly prides itself on promoting its principle of amateur athleti-
cism. In other words, the NCAA desires that student-athletes com-
pete solely for the pure joy and spirit of competing while
simultaneously obtaining a solid education (rather than competing
for money).32
A more detailed analysis of the NCAA rules regulating gifts to
athletes is beyond the scope of this Article but is addressed in an-
other Article.33 One item worthy of mentioning, however, is that
whether a non-paid student-athlete competes on the same or op-
posing team of a paid student-athlete escapes relevance. If the non-
paid student-athlete competes on the opposing team, the paid ath-
lete might be better, stronger, faster, better nourished and better
rested. The resulting win for the paid athlete becomes tainted (as-
suming the paid athlete still practices and gets to the playing field
on game day to win instead of lounging on his new leather couch
eating ice cream all day until he can no longer get off the couch to
get to the playing field). Similarly, if a non-paid student-athlete
competes on the same team as the paid athlete, the paid athlete
might earn more awards (e.g., All-American, Heisman Trophy and
breaking school, conference and NCAA records). Further, scouts
for professional teams might find the paid athlete more talented,
when in reality and unbeknownst to the scouts, the paid athlete's
performance resulted not from being more gifted, but simply from
being better fed and rested. In turn, the professional teams might
draft the paid athlete over the non-paid athlete and/or pay him
more money. Such a result again seems to taint not just the particu-
31. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
32. See id.
33. See Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, Statutory Regulation of Agent Gifts to Athletes,
10 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 265 (2000).
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lar game but also the integrity of the entire NCAA competition
structure. Thus, the NCAA prohibits student-athletes from execut-
ing contracts with, and accepting gifts from, athlete agents. 34
E. NCAA Deregulation: Is the NCAA the Real Culprit?
As noted above, the NCAA historically has premised and justi-
fied its existence on the principle of preserving and promoting the
integrity of amateur, intercollegiate athletics and the resultant edu-
cational value.35 Interestingly, the NCAA recently decided to ex-
plore whether it should deregulate its amateurism principle. In
fact, the NCAA's Vision Statement for amateurism deregulation
provides, in pertinent part:
[S] ome prospects lost all or a significant amount of their
collegiate eligibility for violations that did not result in any
competitive advantage, while other prospects who partici-
pated in extensive organized competition and gained sig-
nificant competitive advantage were able to enjoy four
seasons of collegiate competition .... Ultimately, as der-
egulation continues as an ongoing process, it will result in
legislation that is consistent and reasonable while preserv-
ing the uniqueness and integrity of intercollegiate
athletics.36
Accordingly, until we know whether and to what extent the NCAA
ultimately deregulates amateurism, the future value of state athlete
agent statutes will remain unclear. Only time will tell which course
the NCAA will pursue and what effect such course will have on in-
tercollegiate sports.
Assuming the NCAA continues its current prohibitions on
agent contracts and gifts, one cannot help but question whether the
NCAA's principle of amateurism possesses any merit in today's
sports marketplace. As previously noted, the true driving force be-
hind a state's enactment of an athlete agent statute lies in the finan-
cial devastation that the NCAA potentially could inflict upon a
college or university and, indirectly, the athlete and state.37 The
financial havoc, as it concerns athlete agents, arises solely because
an agent executes a contract with, or provides a gift to, an athlete.
34. See supra notes 26, 30 and accompanying text.
35. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
36. The entire text of the NCAA's vision statement can be obtained from the
NCAA's official Web site: http://www.ncaa.org/agents-amateurism.
37. See supra notes 6-23 and accompanying text.
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Once this occurs, the NCAA deems the athlete ineligible and una-
ble to compete further in that particular sport.3s As noted earlier,
if the athlete does compete after becoming ineligible and the
NCAA learns of the infraction, the NCAA can sanction the univer-
sity by requiring it to forfeit or pay back a multi-million dollar pay-
out.39 In other words, "but for" the NCAA regulations, an athlete
agent could sign a contract with an athlete and provide gifts to an
athlete.
The critical significance of this predicament emerges when
one considers the harsh penalties that athlete agent statutes may
thrust upon agents in many states. As noted below, many states
deem it a criminal offense for an athlete agent to cause an athlete
or university to violate an NCAA rule. 40 Many of these states deem
such agent action as felonious, rather than misdemeanor, in na-
ture.41 Furthermore, if an agent merely provides a student-athlete
with a ride home from a game, such agent action causes the athlete
to violate an NCAA regulation (i.e., accepting a benefit not availa-
ble to the general student body - thus accepting an impermissible
gift from the agent).42 It would likely appall many individuals to
learn that a court could send an agent to jail for a very long time
and fine her thousands of dollars, merely for giving an athlete a
ride home. The scenario becomes even more distressing when one
learns that this could happen even if the agent did not say two
words about signing a contract or representing the athlete to the
athlete during the entire ride home. Neither the statutes nor the
NCAA rules differentiate between "caring" and "selfishly-motivated"
athlete agent acts. The NCAA rules serve as the only vehicle for
which an athlete agent potentially could go to jail for merely pro-
viding a ride home to an athlete. Indeed, society generally does not
imprison people for acting kindly toward other human beings (as-
suming things such as bribery of a government official do not
occur).
Yet, what is a state to do? The NCAA rules place states in a "no-
win" situation. A state's only choice is either to allow athlete agents
38. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 12.3.1. Athletes can be deemed ineli-
gible for all sports, or just the particular sport in which the violation occurred,
depending on the circumstances. See id.
39. See infra notes 78-125 and accompanying text.
40. See infra APPENDIX B.
41. See Remis, supra note 7, at 54-59 nn.212-41 and accompanying text, apps.
C & D (detailing specific criminal treatment of athlete agent conduct in each
state).
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to cause athletes and/or university personnel to violate NCAA rules
without remorse or, alternatively, to regulate and punish the agents
for causing such violations. It is interesting to note, though, that
the NCAA's somewhat self-righteous claim of preserving the spirit
and integrity of intercollegiate athletics seems contradictory at best.
For example, the going salary rate for coaches of top football pro-
grams constantly rises, currently equaling $1 million. 43 Three years
ago only Steve Spurrier and Bobby Bowden were above the $1 mil-
lion threshold, whereas currently fourteen coaches now earn such
salaries. 44 Expectations are that soon twenty of the 114 Division I-A
coaches will join this "millionaire-coaches-club." 45 Currently, Steve
Spurrier receives an annual salary of $2.1 million to coach the Flor-
ida Gators, and Bobby Bowden receives $1.5 million to coach the
Florida State University Seminoles. 46 Other schools topping the $1
million dollar mark include Oklahoma, Auburn, LSU, Clemson,
Tennessee, Texas, Ohio State, Washington, Kansas State, Wiscon-
sin, Texas A&M and Virginia Tech.47 Furthermore, coaches earn
additional sources of income (other than from their universities)
such as monies derived from shoe and apparel endorsement con-
tracts and radio and television appearances.48
As noted earlier, the NCAA expressed its "Principle of Ama-
teurism" as follows: "Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an inter-
collegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated
primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social bene-
fits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics
is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from ex-
ploitation by professional and commercial enterprises. ' 49 It thus
appears that when it comes to making money off of a student-ath-
lete's talent, the NCAA does not primarily concern itself with ex-
ploitation of student-athletes by coaches and universities, but rather
just by athlete agents and professional sports teams. 50 In the
43. See Kelly Whiteside & David Leon Moore, Top Programs Pay the Going Rate:
Beamer Latest to Become a Millionaire, USA TODAY, Nov. 28, 2000, at 6C.
44. See Thomas O'Toole, Plan on $1 Million to Lure Top Coaches, USA TODAY,
Nov. 28, 2000, at 8A.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. (stating, "Private schools generally don't release salary figures.").
48. See Whiteside & Moore, supra note 43, at 6C.
49. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 2.9.
50. See generally NCAA MANuAL, supra note 15 (addressing mainly athlete
agents and professional sports teams). Of course the NCAA does concern itself
with exploitation of athletes by universities in that the NCAA Manual contains nu-
merous rules on things such as credit hour requirements and years of eligibility to
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NCAA's eyes, athletes should not make money but coaches and uni-
versities may make obscene amounts of money from the student-
athletes' talents and hard work.
Further, as for the NCAA's desire to preserve the integrity of
intercollegiate sports, one might have difficulty claiming that integ-
rity and fair play exist when schools such as Florida State University
and the University of Florida recruit the best students year after
year. It may be difficult to find integrity when these same schools
also have far larger budgets due to more generous alumni dona-
tions to these schools over "non-big-name" schools. In other words,
the odds may be stacked in favor of some "big-time" schools and
their student-athletes - despite the NCAA's claim of integrity and
preservation of the spirit of intercollegiate athleticism. NCAA
sports may not truly involve the preservation of the integrity and
educational value of intercollegiate athletics because all teams in
Division I-A football do not possess a fairly equal chance at winning
games. The University of South Carolina does not have the same
chance at the beginning of the year at playing for the national Divi-
sion I-A football title as Florida State University does. Pre-season
team rankings by the Associated Press and coaches may indicate that
some schools acquired better recruits than other teams during the
off-season. The fact that "big-time" college football schools consist-
ently show average home attendance of up to 100,000 fans may give
a psychological and competitive advantage for winning home
games (especially considering the advantage of the home crowd
noise factor). Some schools may have an endless recruiting advan-
tage because the best recruits usually prefer to enroll in schools
with winning records and chances for bowl appearances. At least
the NFL established salary cap and draft restrictions to ensure that
every team in the NFL theoretically can go to and win the Super
Bowl, thereby ensuring continual fan interest and support in every
city (not just the cities of some powerhouse teams).
A $2.1 million salary for a coach may not be truly reflective of
preserving the "true spirit" of intercollegiate athletics. Rather it
may be more reflective of winning at all costs - with some schools
and athletes having more funds and financial resources with which
to play consistently (unlike the NFL, which tries to ensure equality
among all teams in the league). NCAA football and basketball may
be on the same level today as the professional leagues, with the ex-
ception that at the NCAA level the coaches and universities keep all
ensure that athletes are not exploited solely for their athleticism and do graduate
in a timely fashion. See id.
20011
13
Sudia: The History behind Athlete Agent Regulation and the Slam Dunking
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
80 VILLANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
the money, and athletes get nothing. This fact alone suggests that
the NCAA "exploits" athletes more than professional teams that pay
the athletes millions of dollars and much more than they pay the
professional coaches (and more than the athlete agents who only
take a small percentage fee of the athlete's salary rather than the
NCAA, which gives the athlete no salary and keeps it all for itself
and the coaches).
Yet, the NCAA does not concern itself with all of these truths.
The NCAA does, however, prohibit an athlete from merely verbally
agreeing with an agent in the athlete's senior year to be represented
in the future (i.e., not now) in the athlete's contract negotiations
following the NFL draft, when the athlete has graduated and no
longer plays intercollegiate athletics. 5 1 One could certainly ques-
tion whether the NCAA rules really achieve their goals of preserv-
ing the spirit and educational value of intercollegiate athletics while
simultaneously preventing exploitation of athletes from unscrupu-
lous forces. The coaches' salaries alone prove this point. Further-
more, most coaches, on top of their lucrative salaries, make their
student-athletes wear clothing and/or shoes made by a certain man-
ufacturer so that the coach can receive even more income for him-
self or herself (rather than being primarily concerned with whether
a particular brand would protect the athletes' feet and legs
better) .52
III. ATHLETE AGENT STATUTES/UNIFORM ATHLETE AGENTS ACT
Regardless of the merits of the NCAA's claims of preserving
amateurism and preventing exploitation of athletes, the NCAA
rules are likely here to stay, so states must deal with them in some
fashion (either through legislation to protect their interests or
through potential loss of millions of dollars with little or no re-
course against the athlete agent).53 Even if the NCAA eventually
deregulates amateurism, it currently prohibits student-athletes: (1)
from executing contracts with agents, and (2) from accepting gifts,
and the NCAA sanctions universities for playing ineligible student-
51. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
52. See Remis, supra note 7, at 56 n.225. Former Georgetown coach, John
Thompson, pioneered shoe contracts for coaches. At one time, Thompson served
on Nike's Board of Directors, owned shares of Nike stock worth more than $2
million and earned a $350,000 Nike consulting fee. See id.
53. Recourse could be sought through a state's common law or other statu-
tory law (such as a deceptive trade practices act). It is unlikely, however, that any
such laws would prohibit an athlete agent from executing a contract with, or mak-
ing a gift to, another individual (i.e., the athlete).
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athletes. Consequently, states must deal with the issue either by
regulating and punishing agents or simply by allowing agents to
cause NCAA violations without penalty. As previously noted, the
fact that universities and colleges, and indirectly the state, can lose
or forfeit multi-million dollar payouts encouraged twenty-eight
states to enact athlete agent legislation. The following discussion
demonstrates some of the typical statutory provisions contained
within the twenty-eight athlete agent statutes and various ways for
athlete agents to escape such regulation.
A. Statutory Provisions
1. Definitions
A review of the twenty-eight athlete agent statutes reveals that
each statute contains both similarities and differences to the athlete
agent statutes of sister states. As evidenced in Appendix A, each
statute and the UAA have a section containing definitions. This
may appear rudimentary in that most statutes (not just athlete
agent statutes) wisely include a definitions section. However, as will
be discussed below, the peculiar significance of the definitions sec-
tions lies in the way with which the twenty-eight legislatures improv-
idently defined various statutory terms. These terms provide
athlete agents with ways to avoid regulation altogether (i.e., self-
defeating definitions).
The similarities continue in that not only does each state con-
tain a definitions section, but also some particular terms within
those sections appear in almost every state statute and the UAA.
For example, the UAA and every state (except Indiana and Minne-
sota) define the term "athlete agent" or "sports agent."54 The UAA
and every state (except Iowa, Minnesota and Nevada) define the
term "agent contract." 55 Most states and the UAA include "athlete"
and/or "student-athlete" within their definitions section as well.5 6
Even though similarities abound regarding the definitions sec-
tions, a certain uniqueness and peculiarity nonetheless exists with
respect to each of the twenty-eight athlete agent statutes and the
UAA. First, the definitions sections vary as to the number of terms
defined and in the way identical terms are defined in each state and
54. See infra APPENDIX A; see also supra note 1.
55. See id. Although all of these states utilize the term "agent contract," the
UAA refers to the same instruments as "agency contracts" in its definition. See
UAA, supra note 4, § 2.
56. See UAA, supra note 4, § 2.
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the UAA. 5 7 Additionally, most state athlete agent statutes contain
one or more terms that appear only in their own definitions section
and not in those of any sister states' statutes. For example, only
Louisiana defines the term "federation or association."
5 8
It is also interesting to compare the twenty-eight state statutes
with the UAA. Some terms appear in one or more state statutes but
not in the UAA (e.g., the UAA does not define the term "athlete"
like eleven states do, but it does define the term "student-athlete" as
do fourteen other states).59 Additionally, the UAA does not define
the terms "financial services" or "financial services contract" even
though ten state statutes define one of these terms and even
though many athlete agents provide various types of financial ser-
vices to athletes. 60 Similarly, the UAA contains some terms that
none of the twenty-eight statutes defined, such as "record," "regis-
tration" and "intercollegiate sport."61
2. Other Provisions
Appendix B demonstrates some of the primary regulatory pro-
visions most commonly contained within the twenty-eight athlete
agent statutes and the UAA. First, the issue arises as to whether an
athlete agent must register with the state in which she conducts her
athlete agent business. Twenty-two states require agent registration
prior to the agent conducting business in the state, although some
states and the UAA provide for temporary licensure so that agents
may conduct business while their application is pending. 62 The
agent's obligations to the state, however, do not end with licensure.
Instead, fourteen states and the UAA call for various record keep-
ing and reporting requirements. 63 Further, twenty-one states and
the UAA impose obligations on the athlete agent to provide various
notices to the state and/or educational institution attended by the
57. See infra APPENDIX A. For example, the UAA defines twelve terms. See
UAA, supra note 4, § 2. In contrast, Nevada only defines two terms. See NEV. REV.
STAT. § 597.920 (1997).
58. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:421 (West 1999).
59. See infra APPENDIX A; see also UAA, supra note 4, § 2.
60. See id. For an analysis of the numerous functions athlete agents perform
for their athlete clients including financial services, see Remis, supra note 7, at 6
nn.12-16 and accompanying text.
61. See UAA, supra note 4, § 2; see also infra APPENDIX A.
62. See, e.g., UAA, supra note 4, § 8; see also infta APPENDIX B; Remis, supra note
18, at 428-41 nn.30-97 and accompanying text (detailing registration requirements
mandated by athlete agent statutes).
63. See, e.g., UAA, supra note 4, § 13; see also infra APPENDIx B; Remis, supra
note 18, at 444-47 nn.111-24 and accompanying text (analyzing reporting require-
ments imposed by athlete agent statutes).
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athlete (e.g., pre-contractual or post-contractual notice of the exis-
tence of a contract between the agent and an athlete).64 Some stat-
utes, as well as the UAA, require the athlete (notjust the agent) to
provide various notices to the state or educational institution.
65
Similarly, twenty-four states and the UAA impose obligations on the
athlete agent to provide various notices to the athlete, usually in the
form of a warning on the face of the contract itself regarding the
consequences to the athlete upon signing the contract with the
agent.66 Such notices, when required on the contract, usually must
appear in boldface, capital letters or otherwise conspicuous type to
ensure the athlete recognizes and appreciates the severity of the
consequences upon signing the agent contract.67 Agents must keep
in mind that players' associations also mandate certain registration,
reporting and notice requirements. 68
A prime concern of athlete agents is that all state statutes and
the UAA contain some type of remedy or penalty provision.
Twenty-three states and the UAA provide for civil legal relief against
the athlete agent, although states differ as to whether the actions
may be brought by the athlete, educational institution, state and/or
other injured party.69 Under the UAA, only the educational institu-
tion may bring suit.70 Further, the UAA limits the educational insti-
tution to suing the athlete agent or former student-athlete. 71 Thus,
the UAA provision implicitly means that an educational institution
cannot sue a current student-athlete for violating the athlete agent
statute, even if the student-athlete is a freshman at the time of the
violation, which causes the educational institution to lose millions
64. See, e.g., UAA, supra note 4, § 11; see also infra APPENDiX B; Remis, supra
note 18, at 444-47 nn.11-24 and accompanying text (listing numerous types of
filing requirements typically imposed on athlete agents with respect to states and
educational institutions).
65. See, e.g., UAA, supra note 4, § 11.
66. See, e.g., id. § 10; see also infra APPENDIX B; Remis, supra note 18, at 444-47
nn.111-24 and accompanying text (listing numerous types of notice requirements
commonly required of athlete agents with respect to athletes).
67. See, e.g., UAA, supra note 4, § 10.
68. See Remis, supra note 18, at 449-57 nn.133-61 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing how various players' associations regulations coincide and/or conflict with
mandates of various state athlete agent statutes).
69. See, e.g., UAA, supra note 4, §§ 16-17. For an analysis of whom may bring a
civil cause of action in the various states (i.e., athlete, university, state or other
injured party), see Remis, supra note 7, at 17-20 (noting that, in addition to states'
provisions for civil penalties, many statutes also authorize private causes of action).
70. See UAA, supra note 4, § 16(a) ("An educational institution has a right of
action against an athlete agent or a former student-athlete for damages caused by a
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of dollars and even if the statute of limitations runs on the particu-
lar cause of action before the student-athlete graduates (which
could be six years down the road).
The particular type of legal relief available also differs byjuris-
diction, including money damages, court costs, attorney fees, puni-
tive damages and/or treble damages. 72 Twenty-six states and the
UAA provide for equitable relief against the athlete agent, includ-
ing, non-exhaustively: injunctions, suspension or revocation of the
agent's license, voiding of agent contracts executed with athletes,
forfeiture of surety bonds, forfeiture of rights to repayment of
funds advanced to athletes and/or refunds of consideration paid by
athletes to the agent.7 3 Thirteen states and the UAA also provide
for an administrative penalty against the athlete agent.74 The UAA
recommends $25,000 but leaves the exact monetary amount for the
states to decide. 75
Even more frightening to athlete agents, twenty-six states and
the UAA provide that athlete agent violations of the statute consti-
tute criminal offenses; they are either felonies or misdemeanors,
depending on the jurisdiction and the particular offense.76 The
UAA recommends criminal treatment of the offense, but it leaves
the specific classification of the crime up to the states; the UAA
does not recommend treating the offense as either misdemeanor or
felonious, but instead, it includes both as options in its recom-
mended criminal provision. 77
B. Slam Dunking the Statutory Hurdles
With all the complicated and onerous athlete agent statutes in
existence, athlete agents need some way of determining how to
avoid being sued, fined and/or imprisoned. Considering the multi-
millions of dollars potentially at stake pursuant to a civil lawsuit
brought against an agent by a university, the risk of such penalties
looms like a funnel cloud over all of the agent's activities. Fortu-
nately, most of the athlete agent statutes were poorly drafted (to
72. See, e.g., id. § 16(b) (stating potential damages from violation of Act).
73. See id. §§ 4, 7; see also infra APPENDIX B.
74. See UAA, supra note 4, § 17 (stating that civil penalty against athlete agent
is not to exceed $25,000); see also infra APPENDIX B.
75. See UAA, supra note 4, § 17.
76. See id. § 15; see also infra APPENDIX B. For a more detailed analysis of the
particular crime classification for each state (i.e., felony or misdemeanor), see Re-
mis, supra note 7, apps. C & D, at 22-23, 63-72.
77. See UAA, supra note 4, § 15 (stating that criminal penalties are left to states
due to wide variation in existing acts).
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varying degrees), thus providing the agent with some needed
breathing room. The following discussion will outline the various
steps an athlete agent can take to avoid civil liability or criminal
conviction upon being sued or prosecuted under a particular ath-
lete agent state statute. 78
1. Constitutional Vagueness Doctrine/Definitions
The first step in escaping athlete agent legislation entails the
constitutional doctrine of vagueness. Laws become void for vague-
ness, and thus have no effect, if they do not define clearly their
prohibitions. 79 Our laws must provide people of ordinary intelli-
gence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct a statute pro-
hibits so that they may act accordingly.80 Vague laws serve as a trap
for innocent people by failing to provide them with fair warning.81
In other words:
Statutes that are insufficiently clear are void for three rea-
sons: (1) to avoid punishing people for behavior that they
could not have known was illegal; (2) to avoid subjective
enforcement of the laws based on "arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement" by government officers; and (3) to
avoid any chilling effect on the exercise of First Amend-
ment freedoms.8 2
In the athlete agent context, several provisions contained
within many of the athlete agent statutes defy clarity to say the least.
Most importantly, a great source of this vagueness and ambiguity
lies in the definitions sections of the statutes. For example, Missis-
sippi's statute defines "athlete agent" by referencing individuals
78. It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze in great detail the numer-
ous ways in which athlete agents may attack each of the particular athlete agent
statutes currently in existence. For such an analysis, see Rob Remis & Diane Sudia,
Escaping Athlete Agent Statutory Regulation: Loopholes and Constitutional Defectiveness
Based on Tri-Parte Classification of Athletes, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 1 (1999) (ex-
plaining how various loopholes, vagueness and statutory defects work as to render
athlete agent statutes virtually powerless).
79. See Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 533 (6th
Cir. 1998) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)) (noting
that Supreme Court has explained how vague laws offend several important
values).
80. See id. (observing that this must be done under assumption that people
are free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct).
81. See id.
82. Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09).
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who have certain contact with an "athlete."83 The statute does not
define the term "athlete," but it does define the term "Mississippi
NCAA athlete," which references remaining intercollegiate eligibil-
ity.8 4 The statute contains provisions that prohibit any conduct by
an athlete agent involving "athletes,"85 and other provisions of the
statute prohibit only that conduct involving "Mississippi NCAA ath-
letes." 86 This vagueness makes it very difficult to understand which
dealings with athletes potentially may subject the agent to liability.
To complicate the issue further, some statutory provisions explicitly
distinguish between "athletes" and "Mississippi NCAA athletes."
87
The statute also prohibits some conduct involving "NCAA athletes,"
which is another term not defined in the statute.88 Determining
which type of conduct will subject an athlete agent to liability there-
fore becomes an arduous task at best.
Oklahoma provides yet another example of inartful and vague
statutory drafting. Oklahoma parallels Mississippi in that the stat-
ute defines the terms, "athlete agent" and "Oklahoma NCAA ath-
lete."8 9 The Oklahoma statute then includes within the definition
of "athlete agent" the term "athlete," a term that the statute does
not define. 90 The Oklahoma legislature then proceeded to define
the term "Oklahoma non-NCAA athlete" and made several provi-
sions of the statute applicable only to such athletes.9 1 The end re-
sult achieved by Oklahoma amounts to a statutory piece of artwork
containing incomprehensible definitions and provisions.
Athlete agents reading the Oklahoma statute should not feel
embarrassed for experiencing any inevitable confusion because the
Oklahoma legislature appears to have confused itself with its
strange set of mangled definitions and provisions. In some provi-
83. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-1(b) (1997) (defining "athlete agent" as one
who "directly or indirectly, recruits or solicits an athlete").
84. See id. § 73-41-1 (e).
85. See id. § 7 3 -4 1-11(g) (stating rules for executing contract with "athlete"
before completion of athlete's last intercollegiate sports contest).
86. See id. § 73-41-3 (discussing contact with "Mississippi NCAA athlete" prior
to registering as agent with Mississippi Secretary of State).
87. See id. § 73-41-11 (g) (prohibiting agents from "enter[ing] into any agree-
ment, written or oral, by which the athlete agent will represent the athlete, or give
anything of value to a Mississippi NCAA athlete, until after completion of the ath-
lete's last intercollegiate sports contest, including postseason games").
88. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-1 (e) (explaining division of fees and receipt
of compensation for "NCAA athlete" from professional sports league or franchise).
89. See id. § 7341-1; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.61 (1997).
90. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.61 (A) (2).
91. See id. § 821.61 (A) (5); see also id. § 821.62(A)(2) (prohibiting contact be-
tween athlete agents and certain "Oklahoma non-NCAA athletes").
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sions, the Oklahoma legislature actually protects "Oklahoma non-
NCAA athletes" over "Oklahoma NCAA athletes."92 After reading
through several definitions and other statutory provisions, one dis-
covers that in some parts of the statute, Oklahoma extends statutory
protection only to "Oklahoma non-NCAA athletes" who, by defini-
tion, comprise those Oklahoma residents who are not eligible to
participate in intercollegiate athletics at an Oklahoma NCAA insti-
tution of higher education. 93 Mississippi and Oklahoma provide
merely two examples of the vague definitions contained within
many athlete agent statutes that render it nearly impossible to de-
termine which type of conduct will subject an athlete agent to
liability.9 4
2. Constitutional/Jurisdictional Defects
Another way for agents to "slam dunk the statutory hurdles"
lies in the unconstitutional exercise of jurisdiction over non-resi-
dent athlete agents. In order to control and penalize the actions of
a non-resident defendant (i.e., the athlete agent), the state must
possess personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In deciding
whether a state possesses personal jurisdiction in a given set of cir-
cumstances, courts must apply a two-pronged analysis.95 First, in
diversity cases, courts must determine whether jurisdiction is au-
thorized by a particular state's long-arm statute. 96 Second, courts
must decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment will be violated by the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant.97 Whenever a state's long-arm statute attempts to exer-
cise jurisdiction to the extent consistent with due process, courts
only need to follow the dictates of the United States Constitution.98
92. See id. § 821.63.
93. See id. (regarding agent contracts with Oklahoma non-NCAA athletes).
To understand further this bizarre set of statutory definitions, see Remis & Sudia,
supra note 78, at 29-34 (observing that such terms and definitions allow loopholes
for agents to escape responsibility under statute).
94. For a more in-depth analysis of the vagueness inherent in many statutes,
see Remis & Sudia, supra note 78 (discussing various state statutes and their differ-
ing terms and regulations).
95. See Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782, 784 (E.D. Tex. 1998)
(citations omitted).
96. See id. (citing Buillon v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1990); see
also FED. R. Crv. P. 4(e)).
97. See Mieczkowski, 997 F. Supp. at 784 (citing Ham v. La Cienega Music Co., 4
F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 1993)).
98. See id. (citing Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994)).
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With respect to personal jurisdiction, due process imposes two
requirements. 99 First, the defendant (i.e., athlete agent) must have
"minimum contacts" with the forum state.10 0 Second, the state's ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction must not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."10 1 The "minimum contacts"
analysis separates jurisdiction into two classifications: (1) "specific"
personal jurisdiction; and (2) "general" personal jurisdiction. 102
"Specific jurisdiction exists when the nonresident defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state arise from, or are directly related to, the
cause of action. General jurisdiction exists when a defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state are unrelated to the cause of action but
are 'continuous and systematic' and considered substantial."1 0 3 A
finding of general jurisdiction requires more extensive contact with
the forum state than does a finding of specific jurisdiction. 10 4
In the athlete agent context, the athlete agent statutes flourish
with unconstitutional attempts at obtaining jurisdiction over non-
resident athlete agent defendants. The Ohio statute serves as one
of the worst abuses of due process principles. The Ohio statute pro-
vides that "a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an ath-
lete agent who resides or engages in business outside [Ohio] as to a
cause of action arising from the athlete agent entering into an
agent contract with a student-athlete outside [Ohio] without comply-
ing with section 4771.02 of the Revised Code."1 0 5 A reading of this
one sentence from Ohio's statute demonstrates its obvious uncon-
stitutional stretch of jurisdictional power, attempting to reach ath-
lete agents who have had absolutely no contact with the forum state
(i.e., Ohio) - much less the requisite "minimum contacts" required
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 0 6
99. See id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72, 476 (1985); Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647; Polythane Sys. v.
Marina Ventures Int'l, 993 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.1993)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Mieczkowski, 997 F. Supp. at 784 (citing Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647).
103. Id. (citations omitted).
104. See id. at 785 (citing Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374
(5th Cir. 1987)) (noting that general jurisdiction will only be found when defen-
dant's contacts in forum state are "continuous and systematic").
105. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4771.06 (Anderson 2000) (emphasis added).
106. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. For more examples of
statutes improperly asserting jurisdiction over non-resident athlete agents, see Re-
mis & Sudia, supra note 78.
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3. Explicit Exemptions/Implicit Loopholes
Fortunately for athlete agents, some states explicitly exempt
certain individuals from the regulatory scope of the statute or ac-
complish the same result through implicit loopholes buried within
the statute. Unfortunately, however, finding those exemptions and
loopholes can prove incredibly challenging. Quite simply, the
countless explicit exemptions and implicit loopholes remain far too
complex and numerous to warrant a detailed discussion in this Arti-
cle, but they are addressed more fully in another Article. 10 7 A few
examples, however, should enlighten the reader as to how these
exemptions and loopholes appear and work to the agent's benefit.
Some states explicitly exempt from the definition of "athlete
agent" those individuals who are employees or other representa-
tives of a professional sports team.108 Likewise, California exempts
some, but not all, "talent agencies" from the statutory definition of
athlete agent. 10 9 California further exempts athlete agents when
acting solely for their "spouse, child, foster care ward, or
grandchild."' 10 Some statutes contain provisions that apply to
agent conduct involving "student-athletes" only; agents must be ex-
tremely cautious, therefore, as many statutes have provisions that
apply to "student-athletes" only, while other provisions may apply to
any athlete (i.e., professional, student and/or amateur)."'
To make matters worse, athlete agents must exercise extreme
caution prior to contacting almost anyone in some states, including
those states eventually adopting the UAA. For example, the UAA
defines "student-athlete," as follows: "an individual who engages in,
is eligible to engage in, or may be eligible in the future to engage
in, any intercollegiate sport;" if an individual is "permanently ineli-
gible to participate in a particular intercollegiate sport, the individ-
ual is not a student-athlete for purposes of that sport."'1 2 Thus,
107. For an in-depth analysis of what exemptions and loopholes exist within
the twenty-eight athlete agent statutes, see Remis & Sudia, supra note 78. For a
detailed listing of those numerous exemptions and loopholes, see id. app. C at 96-
122.
108. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-26-2(3) (1993). It should be noted that many
athlete agent statutes also contain restrictions on athlete agent income. For a sepa-
rate analysis of the ethical and statutory restrictions on athlete agent income, see
Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, Ethical and Statutory Limitations on Athlete Agent Income:
Fees, Referrals and Ownership Interests, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 787 (2000) (observing
that athlete agents must take care to read all statutes and rules that govern their
conduct).
109. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 18895.2 (West 1999).
110. See id.
111. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-1 to 41 (1993).
112. UAA, supra note 4, § 2(12).
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almost any individual in the world is a student-athlete under the
UAA. Some examples of athletes meeting the UAA's definition of
"student-athlete" include high school athletes, junior high or mid-
dle school athletes and elementary school athletes. 1 13 Other states
contain similar provisions, sometimes specifically referencing high
school or elementary school athletes.1 14 For example, California
specifically includes elementary children when defining the term
"student-athlete."'1 15 As amazing as it sounds, the UAA's language
(as well as that of California) perhaps finds an appropriate place in
the athlete agent statutes, since colleges and sporting goods manu-
facturers currently scout student-athletes while they attend elemen-
tary school.' 16
To make matters even worse, some states explicitly or implicitly
authorize the very same conduct that the NCAA specifically prohib-
its. Louisiana provides the perfect example. As previously noted,
the NCAA specifically prohibits all agent gifts to student-athletes.' 17
The dollar value of the gift means nothing to the NCAA so that
even a free car ride would violate NCAA rules. 1 8 Nevertheless, the
Louisiana athlete agent statute allows athlete agents to make several
types of gifts to student-athletes including gifts of $500 or less. 19 In
fact, the Louisiana statute permits agents to provide student-ath-
letes with gifts of $500 or less, even if the student-athlete loses eligi-
bility and the NCAA sanctions the university.120  Amazingly,
Louisiana is not the only state to allow agent gifts to athletes. 121
In fact, even the UAA implicitly allows gifts to athletes. The
NCCUSL, like several states, fell victim to using language that allows
agents to make gifts to athletes. Implicitly under the UAA, agents
can make gifts to student-athletes as long as: (1) the gift is not made
113. See id. § 2.
114. See generally Remis & Sudia, supra note 78 (outlining several state statutes
to note variations between and inconsistencies among them).
115. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 18895.2(i)(1) (West 1999).
116. See, e.g., Remis & Sudia, supra note 78, at 27 n.82 (discussing scouting of
Tyson Chandler by Nike beginning at age of thirteen).
117. SeeNCAA MANuAL, supra note 15, §§ 12.3.1.2, 12.1.1.
118. See id. § 12.3.1.2 ("An individual shall be ineligible if he... accepts trans-
portation or other benefits from any person who wishes to represent the individual
in the marketing of his ... athletics ability.").
119. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:433 (West 2001) (stating that gift over five
hundred dollars to athlete or member of athlete's family is unlawful under certain
conditions).
120. See id.
121. For an in-depth analysis of what gifts are explicitly or implicitly author-
ized in the twenty-eight athlete agent statutes, see Sudia & Remis, supra note 33
(analyzing regulations that govern gifts to athletes). For a detailed listing of those
gift-authorizing provisions, see id. apps. A & B at 302-16.
[Vol. 8: p. 67
24
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol8/iss1/3
THE SLAM DUNKING OF STATUTORY HURDLES
"with the intent to induce a student-athlete to enter into an agency
contract," and (2) the gift comes "after" the agent gets the student-
athlete to sign an agent contract (yet another NCAA violation). 122
This implicit authorization of gifts presents a few problems. First,
proving an athlete agent's subjective "intent" at the time of a gift to
an athlete should prove problematic and difficult. How does the
state prove subjective intent if the gift arrives at Christmas during
the student-athlete's freshman year with no strings attached, and
the agent merely offered it as a Christmas gift and did not try to get
a post-dated contract signed? Other scenarios in which athlete
agents could provide gifts to athletes and avoid liability under the
UAA are not difficult to imagine (e.g., giving one student-athlete a
gift solely to induce the student to introduce and "put in a good
word" for the agent with respect to his roommate - the real athletic
star the agent wants to sign and represent).123 It would have been
preferable if the NCCUSL would have prohibited all agent gifts to
athletes, as the NCAA prohibits all gifts to athletes (not just some
gifts). For example, the California statute simply provides: "no ath-
lete agent or athlete agent's representative or employee shall, di-
rectly or indirectly, offer or provide money or any other thing of
benefit or value to a student-athlete." 124 Such language serves the
state more wisely and efficiently in prohibiting gifts and punishing
agents for causing violations of NCAA rules, which is the real reason
that states enact athlete agent statutes in the first place.125
IV. CONCLUSION
As one can easily see, voluminous exemptions and loopholes
arise in all twenty-eight athlete agent statutes and the UAA. The
UAA provides some welcomed relief in that, as a uniform law, it is
intended for adoption in all states so that consistent obligations and
results can be achieved in any state in which an athlete agent con-
ducts business. Further, its provisions, with the few exceptions
noted above, serve the states well by being relatively straightforward
and uncluttered. However, to accept the UAA as a good thing for
states to adopt, one must first believe that athlete agents should be
regulated in the first place. Unfortunately, as discussed in the fol-
122. See UAA, supra note 4, § 14(a). As for the NCAA prohibition against
athletes signing agent contracts, see NCAA MANUaL, supra note 15, §§ 12.3.1-
12.3.2.1.
123. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see Sudia & Remis, supra note
33.
124. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 18897.6 (West 1999).
125. See supra notes 4-19 and accompanying text.
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lowing paragraphs, convincing someone that athlete agents should
be regulated can be an uphill battle.
First, the mere fact that a state can tell one person that he or
she may not contact or speak to another person seems to fly directly
in the face of our time-honored First Amendment freedoms.
Equally disturbing are the statutory prohibitions against the provid-
ing of sound legal and financial advice to student-athletes who are
not experienced with finances, future drafts or negotiations of pro-
fessional sports and endorsement contracts with large companies
having vastly superior negotiation skills. Equally appalling are
claims that NCAA sports preserve the integrity of athleticism for its
educational and spiritual sake when coaches and schools earn ob-
scene amounts of money off of the student-athletes' talents, while
the student-athletes themselves earn nothing (especially when some
athletes lack basic amenities of life). Claiming that the NCAA pro-
motes true competition for the mere love of the sport when the
NCAA has allowed the system to become so one-sided that relatively
few schools dominate recruiting classes and championships every
year seems transparent and meaningless.
Nevertheless, the states arguably have no choice other than to
regulate athlete agents because the NCAA still prohibits athletes
from signing contracts with agents or accepting gifts from agents.
The NCAA sanctions universities for playing an ineligible athlete
and the result could mean loss or forfeiture of a multi-million dol-
lar bowl payout and millions of dollars from television contracts.
Thus, one can easily understand the states' need to protect their
interests by enacting athlete agent legislation.
However, having just admitted to the justification for state ath-
lete agent legislation, one last hypothetical will be set forth to show
athlete agents exactly what type of absurd results they could face in
this exciting business. Assume for a moment that three state legisla-
tures enact athlete agent legislation: Louisiana, Ohio and
Oklahoma. 126 Also assume that Ohio eventually adopts the UAA's
definition of "student-athlete" (Ohio has not yet done this, but as-
sume that it does for purposes of this hypothetical) 127 Further as-
sume that an athlete agent resides in Louisiana and receives a call
from her neighbor saying she will arrive home late from work, and
126. In fact, these three states did enact athlete agent statutes. See supra note
1 and accompanying text.
127. It is not unreasonable to assume that some states will adopt all of the
UAA's provisions or that some states will adopt various provisions of the UAA in a
piecemeal fashion (but not the entire statute).
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she needs her to pick up her one boy from Little League practice
and her other boy from his last high school baseball game as a se-
nior. The agent, kind-hearted as usual, assures her that it is not a
problem because she was going by the playing fields anyway to pick
up a new baby crib for her other neighbor's baby shower. The
agent watches the Little League child play his heart out, gives him a
"high five" and tells him what a great game he played. The agent
takes both children out to buy them ice cream cones on the way
home to celebrate their wins.
Incredibly enough, the agent theoretically has violated the laws
of several states (more states than the three states mentioned
above). In reality, the Louisiana high school senior is an Oklahoma
NCAA athlete - even though he has never traveled outside Louisi-
ana! This is true because an "Oklahoma NCAA athlete" is defined
as "any athlete who is eligible to participate in intercollegiate sports
contests as a member of a sports team at an institution of higher
education that is located in this state and that is a member of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association.' 128 Oklahoma does not
require a person to be an Oklahoma resident or to be attending
school in Oklahoma; thus, theoretically, most high school children
across America are Oklahoma NCAA athletes as long as they are
"athlete [s] who [are] eligible to participate in intercollegiate sports
contests as a member of a sports team at an institution of higher
education that is located in Oklahoma." 129 In fact, depending on
how the statute is interpreted, even the child in Little League could
be an Oklahoma NCAA athlete.' 30 As a result, the Louisiana agent
should ensure that she reads the Oklahoma statute to make certain
she is not violating any laws when talking to, giving a ride to and
buying ice cream cones for these potential Oklahoma NCAA ath-
letes. Luckily, even though the agent resides and conducts business
in Louisiana, Louisiana allows gifts to athletes under various cir-
cumstances.' 8 ' If the agent asks the children if she can represent
them some day when they reach the professional leagues, and the
children smile and say "yes," they have just agreed to be repre-
sented by an agent and could face losing NCAA eligibility (it does
128. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.61 (1997).
129. Id.
130. This depends on whether Oklahoma's requirement of being "eligible"
means "currently eligible" or "not ineligible." For a more detailed analysis of this
Oklahoma issue, see Remis & Sudia, supra note 78, at 28-29 (noting that distinction
is very important because latter definition allows for many more people under
statute).
131. Even if the ice cream cones cost five hundred dollars, the agent would be
safe in Louisiana. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
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not matter that the athlete is not in college at the time, nor that the
agreement is oral, nor that the agreement concerns representation
in the future after eligibility expires). 132 In fact, because the agent
and athlete did not limit the agreement to Major League Baseball
but instead said the "professional leagues," the children face losing
eligibility for all sports (since the agreement was not limited to one
particular sport). 133 Moreover, even though the agent does not re-
side in Ohio, and the oral contract was executed outside Ohio, the
Ohio athlete agent statute potentially could attempt to assert juris-
diction over the agent even though no minimum contacts exist as
required under the Due Process Clause.134
There is yet another "catch" to this scenario. Because we are
assuming Ohio adopted the UAA's definition of student-athlete (as
noted above, Ohio has not in reality done this, but it is likely that
some states eventually will), the agent has another problem: the
newborn infant for whom she was purchasing a crib. The agent just
provided a gift to a potential student-athlete, as the newborn defi-
nitely qualifies as a person who "may be eligible in the future," 135
and perhaps someone who is currently eligible. 136
In sum, no easy answer has been uncovered to solve the prob-
lem of unethical or unscrupulous athlete agent conduct and the
devastating financial circumstances it can thrust upon a state's ath-
letes and educational institutions. In the meantime, athlete agents
should read the athlete agent legislation existing in every state in
which they conduct business.
132. See NCAA MANuAL, supra note 15, § 12.3.1.1.
133. See id. § 12.3.1 (stating that contracts not limited to certain sports will be
deemed applicable to all sports).
134. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text. Of course, the other
Ohio statutory provisions should be checked to see if the agent actually violated
the Ohio statute, as this is just the jurisdictional provision.
135. See UAA, supra note 4, § 2.
136. As previously noted with Oklahoma, this depends on whether the re-
quirement of being "eligible" means "currently eligible" or "not ineligible." For a
more detailed analysis of this issue, see Remis & Sudia, supra note 78, at 29-30; see
also supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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